Optimal Selection of Transaction Costs in a Dynamic Principal-Agent
  Problem by Mguni, David
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
01
06
2v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  3
 M
ay
 20
18
Optimal Selection of Transaction Costs in a Dynamic
Principal-Agent Problem
David Mguni∗†
Abstract
Environments with fixed adjustment costs such as transaction costs or ‘menu costs’
are widespread within financial systems. In economic systems, the presence of fixed
minimal adjustment costs produces adjustment stickiness so that agents must choose a
sequence of points at which time to perform actions. This paper performs an analysis
of the effect of transaction costs on agent behaviour and in doing so, for the first time
studies incentive-distortion theory within an optimal stochastic impulse control model.
The setup consists of an agent that maximises their utility criterion by performing a
sequence of purchases of some consumable good whilst facing transaction costs for each
purchase and a Principal that chooses the fixed transaction cost faced by the agent.
This results in a Principal-Agent model in which the agent uses impulse controls to
perform adjustments on a (jump-)diffusion process. We analyse the effect of varying
the transaction cost on the agent’s purchasing activity and address the question of
which fixed value of the transaction cost the Principal must choose to induce a desired
behaviour from the agent. In particular, we show that with an appropriate choice of
transaction cost, the agent’s preferences can be sufficiently distorted by the Principal
so that the agent finds it optimal to maximise the Principal’s objective even when the
agent’s liquidity is unobserved by the Principal.
Keywords: Impulse control, Principal-Agent model, transaction costs, optimal stochastic
control, verification theorem, implementability, inverse optimal control.
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Introduction
There are numerous environments in which financial agents incur fixed or minimal costs
when adjusting their financial positions; trading environments with transaction costs, real
options pricing and real estate and large-scale infrastructure investing are a few impor-
tant examples. However, despite the fundamental relevance in theoretical finance and eco-
nomic theory, the task of modelling minimally bounded adjustment costs within a dynamic
Principal-Agent model, mechanism design or generally multiplayer model with informational
asymmetries has as of yet, received no analytic treatment.
In this paper, we analyse the effect of transaction costs within a dynamic Principal-Agent
model. In this environment, an agent makes purchases of some costly good over some time
horizon. Each time the agent performs a purchase, the agent incurs at least some fixed
minimal cost (e.g. a transaction cost) which is chosen in advanced by a Principal. The cost
of each purchase is drawn from the agent’s liquidity which is modelled by a jump-diffusion
process and is observed only by the agent. When the agent’s liquidity process hits 0, the
process is terminated as at this point the agent goes bankrupt. Therefore, since the agent’s
purchases incur fixed minimal costs, the agent performs a sequence of discrete purchases
(possibly of varying size) in order to maximise their utility over the horizon of the problem.
Since the Principal gets to choose the fixed value of the transaction cost, the Principal aims
to choose a transaction cost that induces a specific consumption behaviour from the agent.
Since the agent cannot perform its purchases in a continuous fashion, we model the agent’s
problem as an impulse control which allows us to study optimal control problems in which
each action incurs some fixed cost.
Overview
The aim of this analysis is twofold: the first objective is to study the effect of intro-
ducing a transaction cost on the agent’s consumption policy and the relationship between
the agent’s policy and the transaction cost. The second objective of the paper is to fully
determine the value of the transaction cost that induces an agent policy that is desirable
for the Principal. Thus in the latter case, the choice of transaction cost serves to condition
the agent’s preferences so that the timing, magnitude (and total number) of the agent’s
investment adjustments coincide with the Principal’s objectives. The analysis of the paper
is performed with sufficient generality to allow for the Principal to be uninformed about the
agent’s preferences and cash-flow process. Nonetheless, the Principal can transfer wealth to
(or from) the agent at the point of the agent’s investment adjustments in order to induce
desirable changes in the agent’s purchasing policy.
The analysis of the paper is selected with appeal to investigate financial environments
with transaction costs and in which the optimal choice of transaction cost is unknown.
The study of public-private partnerships (e.g. employment initiatives or capital investments
within), trading with transaction costs and central authorities that seek to condition the
behaviour of players in a given financial environment are some examples.
Background
Consider firstly the example of a single irreversible investment for a firm that privately
observes the demand process. In order to maximise its overall profit, the firm strategically
selects a profit-maximising time to enter the market. Secondly consider the case of a firm
that wishes to adjust its production capacity according its observations of market (demand)
fluctuations in order to maximise its cumulative profits. For the firm, increasing production
capacity involves paying investment costs which include fixed costs with which the increases
in production yield additional firm revenue. In this case, to maximise overall profits the
firm selects some optimal sequence of capital adjustments implemented over the firm’s time
horizon.
In the case of the single irreversible firm investment, it is widely known that the optimal
firm strategy is to delay investment beyond the point at which the expected returns of
investment becomes positive - from the agent’s perspective, the late entry of investment
results in a socially inefficient outcome [DP08]. Similarly, in multiple production capacity
case the firm’s decision process relating to profit maximising production capital levels often
also produce socially inefficient outcomes.
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In both cases, it is therefore natural to ask whether it is possible for an (uninformed)
central planner to sufficiently modify the firm’s preferences so that the firm’s investment
decisions produce socially efficient outcomes. The case of a single irreversible firm investment
(with asymmetric information) was analysed in [SK12] in which it was shown that a regulator
can induce socially efficient entry decisions through the use of a posted-price mechanism.
In particular, in [SK12] it is shown that by performing a transfer of wealth at the point
of an agent’s decision, a central authority or Principal who does not observe the state
of the world can sufficiently distort an informed agent’s preferences in an optimal stopping
problem so that the agent’s decision to stop the process coincides with the Principal’s optimal
stopping time.
Presently however, the literature concerning multiple sequential investment analysis has
been primarily limited to entrance and exit problems within environments of complete in-
formation (see for example [DZ00]). Thus, the important case of Principal-Agent models
with multiple sequential investments has thus far not been studied.
Theoretical Framework
The appropriate modelling framework for multiple sequential investment problem in
environments of future uncertainty is optimal stochastic control theory. In stochastic control
theory, the inclusion of fixed minimal control costs induces a form of system modifications
enacted by the agent or controller known as impulse control. Impulse control models are
optimal control problems in which the cost of control is bounded below so that modifying
the system dynamics incurs at least, some fixed minimum cost. In impulse control models,
the dynamics of the system are modified through a sequence of discrete actions or bursts
chosen at times that the agent chooses to apply the control policy. This distinguishes impulse
control models from the classical (continuous) optimal control models in which players are
assumed to continuously make infinitesimally fine adjustments for which the associated costs
can be made arbitrarily small.
Given the discrete nature of the modifying actions of impulse controls, impulse control
models represent appropriate modelling frameworks for financial environments with transac-
tion costs, liquidity risks and economic environments in which players face fixed adjustment
costs (e.g. ‘menu costs’). More generally, impulse control models are suitable for describing
systems in which the dynamics are modified by sequences of discrete, timed actions.
We refer the reader to [BL82] as a general reference to impulse control theory and to
[VLVP07; PS10] for articles on applications. Additionally, matters relating to the application
of impulse control models within finance have been surveyed extensively in [Kor99].
Literature
Current modelling methods of multiplayer interactions with asymmetric information with
multiple (N > 2) adjustments are modelled by stochastic differential games1 with player
controls restricted to those belonging to an absolutely continuous class of controls (e.g.
[Car07; CR09; CS10]). In particular, the restriction to absolutely continuous controls implies
players modify their positions by performing infinitesimally fine adjustments throughout the
horizon of the problem. This renders models with absolutely continuous controls unsuitable
for describing behaviour in systems with fixed minimal costs since continuous adjustment
would result in immediate ruin.
Contribution
This paper addresses the absence of models that analyse strategic interactions within
environments with fixed minimal costs. Our main result is to determine the value of the
transaction cost that induces the Principal’s desired consumption policy to be executed
by the agent. We also conduct a brief analysis of the transaction cost parameter and the
solution to the agent’s optimal control policy.
The results of the paper also lead to a solution to the following inverse impulse control
problem:
1Stochastic differential games represent the multiplayer generalisation of stochastic control theory.
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Let X be a one-dimensional diffusion and let the agent’s impulse control problem be
given by the following problem:
sup
u′∈U
E
[ ∫ τS
t
h(s,Xt0,x0,u
′
s ) +
∑
j≥1
c(Xt0,x0,u
′
τj , zj) + φ(τS , X
t0,x0,u
′
τS )
]
.
where the control policy takes the form u(s) =
∑
j≥1 zj · 1{τj≤τS}(s), s ∈ [t, τS ], z ∈ Z and
{τj}j∈N are F− measurable stopping times. The functions h : R×R→ R and φ : R×R→ R
are the running cost and terminal payoff functions (resp.) and c : R × Z → R, is an
intervention cost function for some given set of admissible interventions Z. The set U is an
admissible control set.
Let D ≡ {X ∈ S : Xt0,x0,us < x
∗} be a given continuation region, that is a region in which
the agent finds it optimal to execute no interventions and suppose the optimal intervention
magnitude z∗ is given by zˆj = xˆ − x
∗ for some real-valued constant xˆ. Let the parameters
λ ∈ R and κ ∈ R by the proportional cost and fixed cost parts respectively so that an impulse
execution of magnitude z incurs a cost (1 +λ)z+ κ. The inverse impulse control problem is
to determine the value of κ and λ for any given pair (xˆ, x∗).
In section 4, we perform an analysis of the effect of changes to the parameter λ on the
quantities (xˆ, x∗). We also determine the values of the fixed cost parameters λ and κ s.th.
given a pair of values (xˆ, x∗), the continuation region D and optimal intervention magnitudes
zˆ are given by D ≡ {X ∈ S : Xt0,x0,us < x
∗} and zˆ = xˆ− x∗ respectively.
Lastly, as a corollary to the above, the paper also yields two results relating to optimal
stochastic impulse control theory: it is shown that the solutions to two distinct optimal
impulse control problems can be made to be identical after a transformation that acts
purely on the intervention cost function.
Organisation
In section 1, we give a description of the problem and highlight the connection to optimal
stochastic control theory with impulse control. In section 2 we give some definitions central
to the apparatus of the impulse control and Principal-Agent problem. We additionally state
some known results which we shall make use of in the main analysis (respectively). In section
3, we give the statement of the main results of the paper which is immediately followed by
the main analysis in section 4. Some of the lengthy computation in the main analysis is
deferred to the appendix, we lastly summarise with concluding comments.
1 Consumption with Transaction Costs
Consider an agent with a liquidity process (cash-flow) which evolves according to a
jump-diffusion process. The agent makes costly purchases and seeks to maximise their
consumption over some given time horizon before the point at which the liquidity process
hits 0 (bankruptcy). Each purchase incurs at least some fixed minimal cost which is drawn
from the agent’s cash-flow (liquidity process) which the agent observes, the agent’s cash-flow
is however not observed by the Principal.
We assume that the market consists of one infinitely divisible good that the agent is able
to purchase and consume. The Principal and agent have misaligned payoffs, therefore the
Principal aims at choosing a fixed value of the transaction cost so as to modify the agent’s
consumption pattern to satisfy some given objective.
A formal description of the problem is as follows:
Let Xs = X(s, ω) ∈ R
+ × Ω be a stochastic process on (Ω,F , (Fs)s≥t,P0) - a filtered
probability space, which represents the agent’s cash-flow process at a time s ∈ R+.
When there are no purchases, the agent’s cash-flow process evolves according to the
following expression:
Xs = x+
∫ s∧ρ
t
ΓXt,xr dr +
∫ s
t
σXt,xr dB +
∫ s
t
∫
γ(Xr−, z)N˜(dr, dz), (1)
P−a.s., the constant Γ := r0+α where r0 ∈ R
+ is the interest rate, α ∈ R is some constant,
B ∈ R is a 1−dimensional standard Brownian motion and N˜(ds, dz) = N(ds, dz)−ν(dz)dt is
a F−Poisson random measure with ν(·) := E[N(1, ·)] is a Le´vy measure; both N˜(ds, dz) and
B(s) are supported by the filtered probability space and F is the filtration of the probability
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space(Ω,P,F = {Fs}s∈[t,τS]). We assume that N and B are independent. σ : R
+ × R→ R
is a diffusion coefficient and S ∈ R is the state space. We assume that the functions
µ : [t, τS ]× R→ R, σ : [t, τS ]× R→ R and γ : R× R→ R satisfy the usual assumptions so
as to ensure the existence of (1) (see [SV06] for exhaustive discussions).
At any time, the agent may make a purchase which incurs some fixed minimal cost,
hence the agent makes purchases over a sequence of Fτk−measurable times. The sizes
of the purchases are {zk}k∈Z and the sequence of times of the agent’s purchases is given
by {τk(ω)}k∈N - an increasing sequence of Fτk−measurable discretionary stopping times
where (τk, zk) ∈ U where Z is the set of feasible agent purchases and T ⊆ R
+ is a set of
Fτk−measurable discretionary stopping times. Thus the double sequence (τ, Z) ≡
∑
j∈N zj ·
1{τj<∞} ∈ U is the agent’s control.
In this environment, the Principal chooses a transaction cost which consists of a fixed
cost κ ∈ R and a marginal cost parameter λ ∈ R which is proportional to the size of the
agent’s purchase both of which are incurred by the agent at the point of each purchase. We
denote by S ⊆ R the state space.
We define the time of bankruptcy as the point at which the agent’s cash-flow process
goes below 0 at which point the agent exits the market. In particular the bankruptcy time
is τS := inf{s > t;X
t,x,(τ,Z)
s ≤ 0}.
The agent’s cash-flow process is therefore affected sequentially at the points of purchases
performed by the agent and is described by a stochastic process Xs = X(s, ω) ∈ R
+ ×Ω on
(Ω,F , (Fs)s≥t,P0) that obeys the following expression:
Xs = x+
∫ s∧τS
t
ΓXt,x,(τ,Z)r dr −
∑
j≥1
((1 + λ)zj + κ) · 1{τj<∞}
+
∫ s∧τS
t
σXt,x,(τ,Z)r dB +
∫ s∧τS
t
∫
γ(X
t,x,(τ,Z)
r− , z)N˜(dr, dz), Xt ≡ x (2)
∀ (s, x) ∈ R+ × R, (τ, Z) ∈ U , P−a.s. and where κ > 0, λ are fixed constants which we shall
refer to as the fixed part of the transaction cost and proportional part of the transaction cost
respectively.
The aim of the agent is to maximise their purchases before bankruptcy.
The agent’s payoff function Π(τ,Z) : R+ × R × U → R is therefore given by the following
expression:
Agent Payoff Function
Π(τ,Z)(t, x) = E
[∫ τS
t
e−δrU(Xt,x,(τ,Z)r )dr +
∑
j≥1
e−δτjc(X
t,x,(τ,Z))
τj− , zj) · 1{τj<τS}
]
,
∀ (t, x) ∈ R+ × R, (τ, Z) ∈ U , where (t, x) is the initial point, U : R → R is some utility
function (we shall later specialise to the case in which U is a power utility function). The
reward term c is given by c(·, zj) = zj which is endowed to the agent at each purchase.
Similarly, the Principal has a payoff function Q(τ,Z) : R+×R→ R which is composed of
a running gain function W : R+ × R→ R, a purchase gain function cP : R×Z → R.
Hence, if the agent performs purchases according to the control (τ, Z) ≡ [τj , zj]j∈N ∈ U
then the Principal’s payoff function is given by the following:
Principal Payoff Function
Q((τ,Z)(t, x) = E
[∫ τS
t
W (r,Xt,x,(τ,Z)r )dr +
∑
j≥1
e−δpτjcP (X
t,x,(τ,Z)
τj− , zj) · 1{τj<τS}
]
. (3)
∀ (t, x) ∈ R+×R, (τ, Z) ∈ U , where δp ∈ (0, 1) is the Principal’s discounting factor. We will
in particular assume that the Principal purchase gain function cP is given by cP (τj , zj) =
λP zj + cP τj + αP where λP , cP , αP ∈ R
+ are constants.
The problem faced by the Principal is to determine the parameters (λ, κ) ∈ R×R which
induce agent purchases at the times and by the magnitudes that the Principal would like
(i.e. that coincide with the policy that maximises (3)).
The agent’s problem is an optimal stochastic control problem, in particular, the agent’s
problem is to find a sequence of selected magnitudes or an impulse control that alters the
agent’s liquidity process in such a way that maximises the agent’s state-dependant payoff.
Since the controls incur fixed minimal adjustment costs, the appropriate model of optimal
5
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stochastic control is impulse control - a formulation of optimal stochastic control theory
in which the cost of control is bounded from beneath. In impulse controls models, the
task of determining the optimal control policy now consists of finding both the optimal
sequence of times to apply the control policy, in addition to determining the optimal control
magnitudes.
In this paper, we study the effect of the fixed cost parameters (λ, κ) associated to the
agent’s impulse control on the agent’s consumption pattern. A central aim of this paper
is determine the pair (λ, κ) and the conditions under which a desirable control policy is
induced, that is determining the transaction cost that leads to the agent finding it optimal
to exercise a control that maximises the Principal’s objective (3).
Throughout the script we adopt the following standard notation (e.g. [CG14; MDG10;
kS07]):
Notation
Let Ω be a bounded open set on Rp+1. Then we denote by: Ω¯ - The closure of the set Ω.
Q(s, x;R) = (s′, x′) ∈ Rp+1 : max |s′ − s|1/2, |x′ − x| < R, s′ < s.
∂Ω - the parabolic boundary Ω i.e. the set of points (s, x) ∈ S¯ s.th. R > 0, Q(s, x;R) 6⊂ Ω¯.
C{1,2}([t, τS ],Ω) = {h ∈ C
{1,2}(Ω) : ∂sh, ∂xi,xjh ∈ C(Ω)}, where ∂s and ∂xi,xj denote the
temporal differential operator and second spatial differential operator respectively.
∇φ = ( ∂φ∂x1 , . . . ,
∂φ
∂xp
) - The gradient operator acting on some function φ ∈ C1([t, τS ]× R
p).
Cd([a, b];U) - The set of ca`dla`g functions that map [a, b] 7→ U for some set U ⊆ Rp.
| · | - The Euclidean norm to which 〈x, y〉 is the associated scalar product acting between
two vectors belonging to some finite dimensional space.
As in [CG14], we will use the notation u = [τj , zj]j≥1 to denote the control policy
u =
∑
j≥1 zj · 1{τj≤τS}(s) ∈ U which consists of F−measurable stopping times {τj}j∈N and
F -measurable impulse interventions {zj}j∈N.
Where it will not cause confusion and where the time index requires emphasis, we will
use the notation Xt,x0(s) ≡ Xt,x0s for s ∈ [t, τS ].
Before embarking on our main analysis, we firstly introduce the stochastic generator
associated to the jump-diffusion process:
The operator L is the stochastic generator of X (the uncontrolled process) acting on some
test function φ ∈ C{1,2}([t, τS ],R) is given by the following:
Lφ(x) =
∑
i=1
Γixi
∂φ
∂xi
+
1
2
∑
i,j=1
(σσT )ij(x)
∂2φ
∂xi∂xj
+ Iφ(x) (4)
∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R, where I is the integro-differential operator defined by:
Iφ(x) :=
l∑
j=1
∫
R
{φ(x+ γj(x, zj))− φ(x) −∇φ(x)γ
j(x, zj)}νj(dzj), (5)
∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R.
Standing Assumptions
A.1. Lipschitz Continuity
We assume the Lipschitzianity of the functions U andW that is, we assume the existence
of real-valued constants cU , cW > 0 s.th. ∀s ∈ [t, τS ], ∀(x, y) ∈ R
p we have for R ∈ {U,W}:
|R(s, x) +R(s, y)| ≤ cR|x− y|.
A.2. Minimally Bounded Costs
We also assume that there exist constants λc, λcP > 0 s.th. infz∈Z c(·, z) ≥ λc,
infz∈Z cP (·, z) ≥ λcP .
Controlled State Process
The process X which describes the agent’s liquidity process is influenced by impulse controls
u ∈ U exercised by the agent where u(s) =
∑
j≥1 zj · 1{τj≤τS}(s) s ∈ [t, τS ]. The impulses
{zi}i∈N ∈ Z ⊂ S ⊆ R where t ≤ τ1 < τ2 < . . . < and where S ⊆ R is a given set so that an
impulse control policy is given by the following double sequence:
u = (τ1, τ2, . . . , ; z1, z2, . . . , ) ∈ U where (τk, zk){k∈N} ∈ [t, τS ]×Z.
We assume U ⊆ R is a convex cone which is the set of control actions for the agent and
Z is the set of admissible impulse values. Indeed, if we suppose that an impulse ζ ∈ Z
determined by some admissible policy w is applied at some F−measurable stopping time
6
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τ when the state is x′ = Xt,x0,·(τ−), then the state immediately jumps from x′ = Xt,x0,τ−
to Xt,x0,wτ = Γ(x
′, ζ) where Γ : R × Z → R is called the impulse response function and
(t, x0) ∈ [t, τS ]× R.
2 Preliminaries
Definition 2.1. For a given agent reward function c, the agent and Principal have
value functions given by the following expressions (resp.) ∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R:
vA(x) = sup
u∈U
Πc,u(t, x), vP (x) = sup
u∈U
Qc.u(t, x). (6)
The above expressions define the agent and Principal impulse control problems (resp.).
Where it will not cause confusion we will occasionally write vA(x) ≡ v(x) for x ∈ [t, τS ]×R
for the agent value function.
Definition 2.2. [Implementability]We say that the agent reward function c : R×Z →
R and transaction cost parameters λ ∈ R and κ ∈ R implement an impulse control policy
u∗ ∈ U if ∀ x ≡ (t, x0) ∈ [t, τS ]× R, u
′ ∈ U the following condition is satisfied:
Π(c,u
∗)(x) ≥ Π(c,u
′)(x). (7)
where the controls u∗ = [τ∗j , z
∗
j ]j≥1 ∈ U and u
′ = [τ ′j , z
′
j ]j≥1 ∈ U .
Indeed, with reference to the Principal’s problem (6); (7) is equivalent to the following:
Find some cost function c that consists of cost parameters λ and κ s.th.:
Π(u
∗)(x) = vA(x), Q
(u∗)(x) = vP (x). (8)
and hence the implementability condition asserts the optimality of the policy u∗ ∈ U for the
agent, given the transaction costs c.
Therefore, to analyse the Principal’s problem it suffices to characterise transaction cost
parameters λ and κ and the conditions on the Principal’s policy for which the agent always
finds it optimal to enact the prefixed impulse control policy u∗ ∈ U (so that the inequality
in (7) is satisfied).
We now give some definitions which are central:
Definition 2.3. Let u be an impulse control policy. We say that an impulse control is
admissible on [t, τS ] if the number of impulse interventions is finite P−a.s, that is to say we
have that E[µ(t,τS (u)] <∞.
We shall hereon use the symbol U to denote the set of admissible controls.
Definition 2.4. Suppose we denote the space of measurable functions by H, suppose
also that the function φ : R → R with φ ∈ H. Let τ ∈ [t, τS ] be some Fτ−measurable
stopping time. We define the agent (non-local) intervention operator M : H → H by the
following expression:
M[φ] := sup
z∈Z
[
φ(Γ(Xt,x0,·τ− , z)) + c(X
t,x0,·
τ− , z)
]
· 1{τ≤τS}, (9)
where Γ : R×Z → R is the impulse response function defined earlier.
The following theorem characterises the optimal policy in optimal stochastic control
problems:
Theorem 2.5. Verification Theorem for Optimal Impulse Control [kS07]
Let X be a stochastic process Xs = X(s, ω) ∈ R
+×Ω on (Ω,F , (Fs)s≥t,P0). Let τ be some
F−measurable stopping time and denote by Xˆ(τ) = X(τ−) + ∆NX(τ) where ∆NX(τ)
denotes a jump at some Fτ−measurable time τ due to N˜ . Denote also by ∆zφ(X(τ)) :=
φ(Γ(X(τ−), z))−φ(X(τ−))+∆NX(τ) where τ ∈ [t, τS ] and z ∈ Z is some Fτ−measurable
stopping time and intervention (resp.).
In the following we will use the shorthand and denote by X(s) ≡ (s,X) ∀(s,X) ∈
[t, τS ]× R and φ ≡ φ(X, ·) ≡ φ(X) ∀X ∈ S.
Suppose also that there exists a function φ ∈ C1([t0, τS ], S) ∩ C([t0, τS ], S¯) s.th. for all
s ∈ [t, τS ]:
i. φ ≥ Mφ in S\∂D where the continuation region D is defined by: D = {X ∈ S, s ∈
[t, τS ];φ(X) >Mφ(X)}.
ii. ∂φ∂s + Lφ(X
·,uˆ(s)) + U(X ·,uˆ(s)) ≤ 0 X ∈ S\∂D.
7
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iii. ∂φ∂s + Lφ(X
·,uˆ(s)) + U(X ·,uˆ(s)) = 0 in D ∀X ∈ S.
Put τˆ0 ≡ t and zˆk ∈ argsupz∈Z{φ(Γ(X(τk−), z)) + c(τk, z)} then define uˆ := [τˆj , zˆj]j∈N
inductively by: τˆj+1 = inf{s > τj ;X
·,uˆ(s) /∈ D1} ∧ τS ∀x ∈ S.
then
φ(x) = Π((τˆ ,Zˆ)(x) = sup
(τ,Z)∈U
Π((τ,Z(x) (10)
for all (t, x) ∈ [t, τS ]× R.
Theorem 2.5 has some technical conditions which we relegate to the appendix. A proof
of the theorem is reported as Theorem 7.2 in [kS07].
From Theorem 2.5 we observe that the state space S splits into two regions, one region in
which the agent performs no purchases which we shall refer to as the continuation region and
another region which we shall refer to as intervention region which upon entry by agent’s
cash-flow process, the agent makes an immediate purchase, we therefore have the following
result:
Corollary 2.6. The sample space splits into two regions that represent a region in which
the agent performs an immediate purchase I1, and a region I2 in which no agent purchases
are made. The the two regions are characterised by the following expressions:
I1 = {x ∈ [t, τS ]× R : V (x) =MV (x),LV (x) + U(x) ≥ 0}
I2 = {x ∈ [t, τS ]× R : V (x) >MV (x);LV (x) + U(x) = 0}.
Remark 2.7 Let us denote by D the region D = {(s,X) ∈ [t, τS ] × R : v(X(s)) >
M[v(X(s−))]} so that D represents the region in which the agent finds an immediate in-
tervention suboptimal. Since S ⊆ R, given s ∈ [t, T ], we can infer the existence of a value
x∗(s) ∈ S for which ∂D = {X = x∗(s)|X, x∗ ∈ S} - that is to say that the agent performs
an intervention as soon as the cash-flow process X attains a value x∗, hence we shall hereon
refer to the value x∗ as the agent’s intervention threshold.
3 Main Results
We now present the main results of the paper; we postpone the proof of the results until
section 4.
Theorem 3.1. Let x∗ be the Principal’s target for the agent’s intervention threshold
and define xˆ = zˆ + x∗ where zˆ is the fixed optimal purchase magnitude. Then the agent
adopts the Principal’s target for the pair (xˆ, x∗) whenever the transaction cost parameters
(λ, κ) are set to the following expressions:
λ(xˆ, x∗) =
G(xˆ, x∗)
b ln( xˆx∗ )
l1z
l1−1 + l2z
l2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
− 1 (11)
κ(xˆ, x∗) = z
zl1 + zl2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
−G(xˆ, x∗)
l1z
l1−1 + l2z
l2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
− z. (12)
where G(xˆ, x∗) := xˆx∗ ln( xˆx∗ ), b := ǫδ
−1 and zm := xˆm − x∗m for m ∈ N.
If the proportional part λ is fixed, then the value of the fixed part κ is given by the
following:
κ(xˆ, x∗, λ) = κ = l−11
[
zl2−1 − (1 + λ)b
zl2
x∗xˆ
]
(xˆl1−1zl2−1 − xˆl2−1zl1−2)−1)zl1
+ l−12
[
zl1−1 − (1 + λ)b
zl1
x∗xˆ
]
(xˆl2−1zl1−1 − xˆl1−1zl2−1)−1zl2 − z + b(1 + λ) ln
( xˆ
x∗
)
. (13)
When the agent’s liquidity process contains no jumps (γ(z) ≡ 0 in (1)), the fixed parameters
l1 and l2 are given by:
l1 = −
Γ− 12σ
2 +
√
(Γ− 12 )
2 − 2σ2δ
σ2
, l2 =
1
2σ
2 − Γ +
√
(Γ− 12 )
2 − 2σ2δ
σ2
, (14)
For the general case (γ(z) 6≡ 0 in (1)), the constants l1 and l2 are solutions to the equation:
h(l) = 0 (15)
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where the function h is given by:
h(l) =
1
2
σ2l(l − 1) + lΓ− δ +
∫
R
{
(1 + γ(z))l − 1− lγ(z)
}
ν(dz) (16)
Theorem 3.1 says that if the Principal imposes the a transaction cost with proportional
part and fixed part given by (11) and (12) respectively, then the agent’s continuation region
is given by D = {x < x∗|x, x∗ ∈ R} i.e. the agent will make a purchase whenever the agent’s
cash-flow attains the value x∗. Moreover, the agent’s purchase times are τˆj+1 = inf{s >
τj ;X
·,uˆ(s) > x∗} ∧ τS and the agent’s purchases will have size given by zˆ = xˆ− x
∗.
The first result of the theorem relates to the case when the Principal is free to choose
the value of the proportional part of the transaction cost parameter λ and the fixed part of
the transaction cost parameter κ. The second result relates to the case when the Principal
is free to choose the value of the fixed part of the transaction cost parameter κ but the
proportional cost parameter λ is exogenous and fixed.
Proposition 3.2. Let the values l1 and l2 be as in Theorem 3.1 and suppose the initial
fixed and proportional costs are given by κ0 and λ0 respectively. Suppose now that the
fixed and proportional costs undergo the transformations κ0 → κ1 and λ0 → λ1, then the
agent’s intervention threshold and consumption magnitude attain the values x∗1 = x
∗
0 + h1
and xˆ1 = xˆ0 + h−1 whenever the values λ1 and κ1 are given by the following expressions:
λ1 =
m−1m1
b
(l1M
l1−1
0 + l2M
l2−1
0 )
(l1M
l1
0 + l2M
l2
0 )
− 1, (17)
κ1 =M0
M l10 +M
l2
0
l1M
l1
0 + l2M
l2
0
− ln
(m−1 + h−1
m1 + h1
)
(m−1 + h−1)(m1 + h1)
[
l1M
l1−1
0 + l2M
l2−1
0
l1M
l1
0 + l2M
l2
0
]
,
(18)
where Mk := (m−1 + h−1)
k − (m1 + h1)
k where m1 < m−1 and m1, m−1 are the solutions
to the equations:
Q1(m,κ0, λ0) = 0, (19)
Q2(m,κ0, λ0) = 0, (20)
where Q1 and Q2 are given by
Q1(m, c, d) :=
b
m1m2
l1M
l1 + l2M
l2
l1M l1−1 + l2M l2−1
−
1
1 + d
, (21)
Q2(m, c, d) :=
bM
m1m2
M l1 +M l2
l1M l1−1 + l2M l2−1
−
M + c
1 + d
+ b ln
(m1
m2
)
. (22)
Proposition 3.2 says that a shift of size h1 and h−1 in the agent intervention threshold and
consumption magnitudes (respectively) can be induced whenever the fixed and proportional
costs are made to be the values κ1 and λ1 of the proposition. Here, interestingly the
initial agent intervention threshold and consumption magnitude do not feature in any of the
equations that determine the values κ1 and λ1, hence the only required data are the target
parameters (x∗1, xˆ1) and the observables (κ0, λ0).
Proposition 3.3. The marginal rates of change in xˆ and x∗ w.r.t. λ and κ are given by
the following expressions:
∂xˆ
∂λ
= [f1(xˆ, x
∗)]−1,
∂x∗
∂λ
= [f2(xˆ, x
∗)]−1,
∂xˆ
∂κ
= [f3(xˆ, x
∗)]−1,
∂x∗
∂κ
= [f4(xˆ, x
∗)]−1.
(23)
where the parameters l1 and l2 are solutions to the equation (15) and the functions f1, f2, f3
and f4 are given by (76) - (79).
Proposition 3.3 therefore evaluates the change in the intervention threshold and con-
sumption magnitudes due to a marginal change in the cost parameters λ and κ.
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The following corollary follows directly from Theorem 3.1 and relates two general (com-
plete information) stochastic impulse control problems:
Corollary 3.4. LetX be a stochastic processXs = X(s, ω) ∈ R
+×Ω on (Ω,F , (Fs)s≥t,P0)
that evolves according to (1).
Consider the following pair of impulse control problems:
I. Find u∗1 = [τ
∗
1j , z
∗
1j ]j∈N ∈ U and φ1 ∈ H s.th ∀ x ≡ (t, x0) ∈ [t, τS ]× R:
φ1(x) = j
(u∗
1
)
1 (x) = sup
u1∈U
j
(u1)
1 (x),
II. Find u∗2 = [τ
∗
2j , z
∗
2j ]j∈N ∈ U and φ2 ∈ H s.th ∀ x ∈ [t, τs]× R:
φ2 = j
(u∗
2
)
2 (x) = sup
u2∈U
j
(u2)
2 (x),
for the payoff functionals for problem I and II are given by the following expressions:
j
(u1)
1 (x) = E
[x]
[∫ τS
t
αe−δs ln(Xt,x0,u1s )ds+
∑
j≥1
(λ1zj + κ1) · 1{τ1j<τS} +Ψ1(τS , X
t,x0,u1
τS )
]
.
(24)
j
(u2)
2 (x) = E
[x]
[∫ τS
t
F (s,Xt,x0,u2s )ds+
∑
j≥1
l2(X
t,x0,u2
τ2j−
, zj) · 1{τ2j<τS} +Ψ2(τS , X
t,x0,u2
τS )]
]
,
(25)
where α, β ∈ R and F, l2,Ψ1,Ψ2 are bounded Lipschitz continuous functions. Suppose also
that the controlled process (with interventions) evolves according to (2). Then if u∗2 ∈
argsupu2∈U j
(u2)
2 (x), then u
∗
1 = u
∗
2 whenever
λ1 =
G(xˆ, x∗)
ρ ln( xˆx∗ )
l1z
l1−1 + l2z
l2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
− 1 (26)
κ1 = z
zl1 + zl2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
−G(xˆ, x∗)
l1z
l1−1 + l2z
l2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
− z, (27)
for all x ∈ R and z ∈ Z where ρ := αδ−1, xˆ2 = x
∗
2 − z
∗
2 , G(xˆ, x
∗) := xˆx∗ ln( xˆx∗ ), and
zm := xˆm − x∗m for m ∈ N and the constants l1 and l2 are solutions to the equation
m(l) = 0 where m : R→ R is the function:
m(l) =
1
2
σ2l(l − 1) + lΓ− δ +
∫
R
{
(1 + γ(z))l − 1− lγ(z)
}
ν(dz). (28)
The parameter x∗2 is the parabolic boundary of the continuation region for problem
II - that is to say, given some continuation region for player II, each x∗2 is of the form
x∗2 = {X ∈ S : X
t,x0,u
∗
2
s ∈ ∂D2} and z
∗ := argsupz∈Z{φ2(Γ(X(τk−), z)) + l2(X(τk), z)}
quantifies the player II optimal intervention magnitude.
Corollary 3.4 says that impulse control problem I has the same optimal control policy so-
lution as that of problem II whenever player I’s intervention cost function has a proportional
cost and fixed cost given by the λ and κ respectively.
Hence, in the language of Section 2, Corollary 3.4 therefore characterises the cost param-
eters which ensure that the agent finds it optimal to intervene according to the Principal’s
optimal intervention policy.
4 Main Analysis
We begin by proving Theorem 3.1 which is proved by showing that given the cost
function parameters λ and κ defined in (11) - (12), it is optimal for the agent to execute the
sequence of interventions that maximises the Principal’s payoff Q.
We seek to characterise the cost function parameters λ and κ which implement the
Principal’s control policy. The sets S,Z and U are the state space, the feasible impulse
interventions and the set of admissible controls (resp.) as before.
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Suppose that the agent makes purchases according to the policy [τk, zk]k≥1 ≡ (τ, Z) ∈ U ,
hence the agent’s payoff function (without transfers) is given by the expression:
Π((τ,Z),0)(t, x) = E
[∫ τS
t
e−δrU(Xt,x,(τ,Z)r )dr +
∑
j≥1
e−δτjzj · 1{τj<∞}
]
,
Denote (τ∗, Z∗) ∈ U the following:
Π(τ
∗,Z∗)(s, x) = sup
(τ,Z)∈U
Π(τ,Z)(s, x),
∀ (s, x) ∈ R+×R, so that given some cost function c, the agent’s optimal purchase strategy
is given by (τ∗, Z∗) ∈ U .
Recall that the state process obeys the following expression:
Xs = x+
∫ s∧τS
t
ΓXt,x,(τ,Z)r dr −
∑
j≥1
((1 + λ)zj + κ) · 1{τj<∞}
+
∫ s∧ρ
t
σXt,x,(τ,Z)r dB +
∫ s
t
∫
γ(X
t,x,(τ,Z)
r− , z)N˜(dr, dz), Xt ≡ x (29)
∀ (s, x) ∈ R+ × R, (τ, Z) ∈ U , P−a.s.. We now specialise to the case in which the agent’s
utility function U is given by:
U(x) = ǫ ln(x), (30)
for some constant ǫ ∈ R\0 so that U can be viewed as a limiting case of the CRRA utility
function: U(x) = ǫx
1−η−1
1−η when η → 1.
Hence the agent’s payoff function Π(τ,Z) : R+ × R× U → R is given by:
Π(τ,Z)(t, x) = E
[ ∫ τS
t
e−δrǫ ln
(
Xt,x,(τ,Z)r
)
dr +
∑
j≥1
e−δτjzj · 1{τj<τS}
]
,
Hence, given some test function φ ∈ C{1,2}([t, T ],R), the generator L for (29) is given by
the following expression (c.f. (4))
Lφ(x) = Γx
∂φ
∂x
+
1
2
σ2x2
∂2φ
∂x2
+
∫
R
{
φ(s, x(1 + γ(z))− φ(s, x) − xγ(z)
∂φ
∂x
}
ν(dz). (31)
By (iii) of Theorem 2.5 we have that on D the following expression holds:
U(s, x) +
∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ = 0. (32)
Hence, using (31) and by (32) we have that:
0 = e−δsǫ ln(x)+
∂φ
∂s
+Γx
∂φ
∂x
+
1
2
σ2x2
∂2φ
∂x2
+
∫
R
{
φ(s, x(1+γ(z))−φ(s, x)−xγ(z)
∂φ
∂x
}
ν(dz).
(33)
Let us try the following ansatz for the candidate function for φ:
φ = φa + φb. (34)
where
φa(s, x) = e
−δsaxl, φb(s, x) = e
−δs(b ln(x) + c). (35)
for some constants a, b, c ∈ R.
We firstly seek to ascertain the values of the constants a, b and c hence, inserting the
expression for φ into (33) we find that:
ha + hb = 0 (36)
where the functions ha and hb are given by:
ha(l) =
1
2
σ2l(l − 1) + lΓ− δ +
∫
R
{
(1 + γ(z))l − 1− lγ(z)
}
ν(dz) (37)
hb(x) = ǫ ln(x) − δ(b ln(x) + c) + bΓ−
1
2
σ2b+
∫
R
{
b ln(1 + γ(z))− bγ(z)
}
ν(dz). (38)
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from which we find that the equation hb(x) = 0 is solved by the following values for b and c:
b = ǫδ−1, (39)
c = ǫ
(
Γ−
1
2
σ2
)
+ ǫ
∫
R
{
ln(1 + γ(z))− γ(z)
}
ν(dz). (40)
Let us make a brief excursion to discuss the case when the process (1) contains no jumps
i.e. when γ ≡ 0. In this case, we readily observe that (37) now reduces to the following
expression:
ha,0 :=
1
2
σ2l2 + l(Γ−
1
2
σ2)− δ. (41)
After some simple algebra, we can deduce that in this case, we observe that there exists two
solutions to the equation ha,0(l) = 0, namely l1 and l2 where l1 and l2 are given by:
l1 = −
Γ− 12σ
2 +
√
(Γ− 12 )
2 − 2σ2δ
σ2
, l2 =
1
2σ
2 − Γ +
√
(Γ− 12 )
2 − 2σ2δ
σ2
. (42)
Let us now return to the case when the process (1) contains jumps. Using (37), we now
make the following observations:
lim
m→∞
ha(m) = +∞, ha(m)
∣∣m=0 = −δ. (43)
Hence we deduce the existence of values l1, l2 s.th.:
h(l1) = h(l2) = 0. (44)
W.log. let us assume that l1 < l2, since ∀ l, z we have that: {(1+γ(z))
l−1− lγ(z)}ν(dz) > 0
we find that:
|l1| > l1. (45)
and
l1 < 0 < l2, (46)
We therefore find that the function φ is given by the following (c.f. (34)):
φ(s, x) = e−δs[a1x
l1 + a2x
l2 + b ln(x) + c], (47)
where a1 and a2 are a pair of as of yet, undetermined constants and b and c are given by
(39) - (40).
Our ansatz for the continuation region D is that it takes the form:
D = {x < x∗|x, x∗ ∈ R}. (48)
We now seek to determine the value of x∗ and characterise the optimal intervention magni-
tude zˆ.
Now by Corollary 2.6 we find that for all x1 ≥ x
∗ we have:
φ(x) =Mφ(x) = sup
z∈Z
{φ(x− κ− (1 + λ)z) + z)}. (49)
We wish to determine the value z that maximises (49), hence let us now define the function
G by the following expression:
G(z) = φ(x − κ− (1 + λ)z) + z, (50)
∀ z ∈ Z, x ∈ R.
Our task now is to evaluate the maxima of (50) from which we readily observe that the
first order condition for the maximum of G is given by:
φ′(x− κ− (1 + λ)zˆ) =
1
1 + λ
. (51)
Let us now consider a unique point xˆ ∈ (0, x∗) then:
φ′(xˆ) =
1
1 + λ
. (52)
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Using (49), we now observe that the following expression holds ∀x ∈ R:
x∗ − κ− (1 + λ)zˆ = xˆ. (53)
We now find that
zˆ(x) =
x− xˆ− κ
(1 + λ)
. (54)
We therefore deduce that φ is given by the following expression ∀x ∈ R:
φ(x) = φ(xˆ) + zˆ. (55)
Using (49) - (55) we readily obtain the following equations:
φ′(xˆ) =
1
1 + λ
(56)
φ′(x∗) =
1
1 + λ
(57)
φ(x∗)− φ(xˆ) =
x∗ − xˆ− κ
1 + λ
. (58)
In the following analysis, it is useful to seperate the analysis into two cases starting with
the case in which the transaction cost λ is fixed (case I) and then analysing a second case
in which the Principal is free to choose the value of λ (case II).
Case I
Inserting (47) into (56) - (58) and by the high contact principle2 , we arrive at the following
system of equations:
i. a1l1xˆ
l1−1 + a2l2xˆ
l2−1 + bxˆ =
1
1+λ
ii. a1l1x
∗l1−1 + a2l2x
∗l2−1 + bx∗ =
1
1+λ
iii. a1(x
∗l1 − xˆl1) + a2(x
∗l2 − xˆl2) = x
∗−xˆ−κ
1+λ + b ln
(
xˆ
x∗
)
where b := ǫδ−1.
The system of 3 equations (i) - (iii) contains 3 unknowns (κ, a1, a2), hence we can solve
for the three unknown parameters (see appendix).
Using (i) - (ii) to solve for a1 and a2 we find that:
a1 =
1
l1
[
bzl2
xˆx∗
−
zl2−1
(1 + λ)
]
(xˆl2−1zl1−1 − xˆl1−1zl2−1)−1, (59)
a2 =
1
l2
[
bzl1
xˆx∗
−
zl1−1
(1 + λ)
]
(xˆl1−1zl2−1 − xˆl2−1zl1−1)−1, (60)
where b := ǫδ−1 and zm := xˆm − x∗m for m ∈ N.
After substituting (59) - (60) into (iii) we readily obtain the expression for the fixed cost
parameter κ:
κ(xˆ, x∗, λ) = l−11
[
zl2−1 − (1 + λ)b
zl2
x∗xˆ
]
(xˆl1−1zl2−1 − xˆl2−1zl1−1)−1)zl1
+ l−12
[
zl1−1 − (1 + λ)b
zl1
x∗xˆ
]
(xˆl2−1zl1−1 − xˆl1−1zl2−1)−1zl2 − z + b(1 + λ) ln
( xˆ
x∗
)
, (61)
Hence, given a pair of target cost parameters (x˜∗, ˆ˜x) ∈ R × R, we see that any op-
timal control for the agent’s intervention threshold becomes x˜∗ and optimal consumption
magnitude becomes z = x∗ − ˆ˜x.
Case II
In order to identify the parameters κ and λ we set a1 = a2 in (47), then substituting into
(56) - (58) we arrive at the following system of equations:
i. a(l1xˆ
l1−1 + l2xˆ
l2−1) + bxˆ =
1
1+λ
2The high contact principle is a condition that asserts the continuity of the value function at the boundary
of the continuation region see [kS07; kS02] for further details.
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ii. a(l1x
∗l1−1 + l2x
∗l2−1) + bx∗ =
1
1+λ
iii. a(x∗l1 − xˆl1 + x∗l2 − xˆl2) = x
∗−xˆ−κ
1+λ + b ln
(
xˆ
x∗
)
where the constant b is given in (39).
The system (i) - (iii) of 3 equations now consists of 3 unknowns (κ, λ, a), hence we can
solve for the three unknown parameters. Now, eliminating the constant a from the system
(i) - (iii) yields the following expressions for the cost parameters:
λ(xˆ, x∗) =
G(xˆ, x∗)
b ln( xˆx∗ )
l1z
l1−1 + l2z
l2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
− 1 (62)
κ(xˆ, x∗) = z
zl1 + zl2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
−G(xˆ, x∗)
l1z
l1−1 + l2z
l2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
− z. (63)
where G(xˆ, x∗) := xˆx∗ ln( xˆx∗ ) and z
m := xˆm − x∗m for m ∈ N.
Hence, given a pair of target cost parameters (x˜∗, ˆ˜x) ∈ R × R, we see that any op-
timal control for the agent’s intervention threshold becomes x˜∗ and optimal consumption
magnitude becomes z = x∗ − ˆ˜x.
By inverting the procedure, we can further deduce that using equations (i) - (iii), we can
derive the values m1, m−1 and H s.th.:
x∗ = m1 (64)
xˆ = m−1, (65)
where m1, m−1 are solutions to the system of equations:
Q(m,κ, λ) = 0 (66)
for Q given by
Q1(m, c, d) :=
b
m1m2
l1M
l1 + l2M
l2
l1M l1−1 + l2M l2−1
−
1
1 + d
, (67)
Q2(m, c, d) :=
bM
m1m2
M l1 +M l2
l1M l1−1 + l2M l2−1
−
M + c
1 + d
+ b ln
(m1
m2
)
(68)
where M := m1 −m2.
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1, we firstly start with the given set of target
parameters {x∗1, xˆ1} and the observed parameters {λ˜0, κ0}, using (i) - (iii), we ascertain the
following expressions for the parameters λ1 and κ1:
λ1 =
m−1m1
b
(l1M
l1−1
0 + l2M
l2−1
0 )
(l1M
l1
0 + l2M
l2
0 )
− 1 (69)
κ1 =M0
M l10 +M
l2
0
l1M
l1
0 + l2M
l2
0
− ln
(m−1 + h−1
m1 + h1
)
(m−1 + h−1)(m1 + h1)
[
l1M
l1−1
0 + l2M
l2−1
0
l1M
l1
0 + l2M
l2
0
]
−M0,
(70)
where M0 := m−1 −m1 and m1, m−1 the solutions to the system of equations:
Q(m,κ0, λ0) = 0 (71)
Though it is not possible to obtain a closed analytic solution to (64) - (65), the values
m1 and m−1 can be approximated using numerical methods.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
To prove Proposition 3.3, we differentiate (i) and (ii) w.r.t. xˆ and x∗ respectively and
plugging in (64) and (65), we now observe that ∂xˆ∂λ ,
∂x∗
∂λ ,
∂xˆ
∂κ ,
∂x∗
∂κ are given by the following
expressions:
∂xˆ
∂λ
= [f1(xˆ, x
∗)]−1, (72)
∂x∗
∂λ
= [f2(xˆ, x
∗)]−1, (73)
∂xˆ
∂κ
= [f3(xˆ, x
∗)]−1 (74)
∂x∗
∂κ
= [f4(xˆ, x
∗)]−1. (75)
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where the functions f1, f2, f3, f4 are given by:
f1(xˆ, x
∗) =
x∗
b
[ l1zl1−1 + l2zl2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
(
1−xˆ
[ l21xˆl1−1 + l22xˆl2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
])
+
xˆx∗
b
[
l1(l1 − 1)xˆ
l1−2 + l2(l2 − 1)xˆ
l2−2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
] (76)
f2(xˆ, x
∗) =
xˆ
b
[ l1zl1−1 + l2zl2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
(
1+x∗
[ l21xˆl1−1 + l22xˆl2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
])
−
xˆx∗
b
[
l1(l1 − 1)xˆ
l1−2 + l2(l2 − 1)xˆ
l2−2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
] (77)
f3(xˆ,x
∗) = (zxˆ−G)
[ l1xˆl1−2 − l2xˆl2−2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
]
+
zl1 + zl2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
[
1− z
l21xˆ
l1−1 − l22xˆ
l2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
]
+G
l21xˆ
l1−2 − l22xˆ
l2−2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
−
(
Gxˆ−1 + x∗ +G
[ l21xˆl1−1 − l22xˆl2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
]) l1zl1−1 − l2zl2−2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
− 1,
(78)
f4(xˆ, x
∗) = (G− zx∗)
[ l1x∗l1−2 − l2x∗l2−2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
]
−
zl1 + zl2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
[
1− z
l21x
∗l1−1 − l22x
∗l2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
]
−G
l21x
∗l1−2 − l22x
∗l2−2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
−
(
Gx∗−1 − x∗ −G
[ l21x∗l1−1 − l22x∗l2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
]) l1zl1−1 − l2zl2−2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
+ 1
(79)
Proof of Corollary 3.4
To prove Corollary 3.4, we firstly consider a control solution to the problem (25) (the
solution can by obtained using Theorem 2.5). Denote the solution by u∗2 ∈ U so that
u∗2 ∈ arg
u∈U
sup Ju2 (t, x) and u
∗
2 = [τ
∗
2j , z
∗
2j ]j≥1 ∈ U and the sets {τ
∗
2j}j∈N and {z
∗
2j}j∈N are
sequences of Fτj−measurable intervention times and intervention magnitudes respectively.
Then by Corollary 2.6 there exist constants xˆ2 ∈ R and x
∗
2 ∈ R s.th τˆj+1 = inf{s >
τj ;X
·,uˆ(s) > x∗p} ∧ τS and zˆ = xˆp − x
∗
p, hence by setting x
∗ = x∗2 and xˆ = xˆ2 in Theorem
3.1 we immediately deduce the result after applying the theorem.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we performed an analysis of the effects of imposing transaction cost on con-
sumption behaviour. The inclusion of a transaction cost precludes agent behaviour policies
in which the agent makes purchases continuously, hence in the model studied in this paper,
the agent’s behaviour is modelled using impulse control. In particular, we studied the effect
of the transaction cost parameters on the consumption policy for an agent whose utility is
given by a power utility function. The results of the paper provide a full characterisation
of the parameters of transaction costs that sufficiently distorts the incentives of a rational
agent so that the agent finds it optimal to adopt a consumption pattern that maximises
the Principal’s objective. Indeed, this paper describes for the first time, a Principal-Agent
model with impulse control. Although the results of the paper are studied within the context
of a liquidity-consumption problem, the results are broadly applicable. Indeed, as described
in Corollary 3.4, the results can be applied to any pair of impulse control problems so that
the cost parameters can be fixed so as to change the optimal control to match that of some
other external objective function.
An interesting avenue for future research is the effect of transaction costs on gen-
eral impulse control problems in addition to specialised Principal objectives such as risk-
minimisation and regime-dependant behaviour.
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6 Appendix
Technical Conditions for Theorem 2.5
i. ∂D is a Lispchitz surface - that is to say that ∂D is locally the graph of a Lipschitz
continuous function.
ii. φ ∈ C1,2([t0, τS ], (S\∂D)) with locally bounded derivatives.
iii. E
[ ∫ τS
t
1∂D(X
·,u(s))ds
]
= 0 ∀X ∈ S, ∀u ∈ U .
iv. X ·,u(τS) ∈ ∂S P−a.s. on {τS < ∞} and φ(X
·,u(s)) → G(X ·,u(τS)) · 1{τS<∞} as
s→ τ−S P−a.s.,∀X ∈ S, u ∈ U
v. The sets {φ−(X ·,u(τm); τm ∈ [t, τS ], ∀m ∈ N} are uniformly integrable ∀X ∈ S, u ∈ U .
vi. E[|φ(X ·,u(τm))|+ |φ(X
·,u(ρj))|+
∫ τS
t
|Lφ(X ·,u(s))|ds] <∞, ∀τm, ρj ∈ [t, τS ], u ∈ U .
vii. zˆk ∈ arginfz∈Z{φ(Γ(X(τk−), z)) + c(τk, z)} is a Borel Measurable selection ∀X ∈ S.
Analysis of constants in Theorem 3.1.
We firstly prove the results of case I.
Recall equations (i) - (iii):
a1l1xˆ
l1−1 + a2l2xˆ
l2−1 +
b
xˆ
=
1
1 + λ
(80)
a1l1x
∗l1−1 + a2l2x
∗l2−1 +
b
x∗
=
1
1 + λ
(81)
a1(x
∗l1 − xˆl1) + a2(x
∗l2 − xˆl2) =
x∗ − xˆ− κ
1 + λ
+ b ln
( xˆ
x∗
)
(82)
Multiplying (80) and (81) by x∗l1 and xˆl1 respectively gives:
a1l1(xˆx
∗)l1−1 + a2l2xˆ
l2−1x∗l1−1 +
bx∗l1−1
xˆ
=
x∗l1−1
1 + λ
(83)
a1l1(x
∗xˆ)l1−1 + a2l2x
∗l2−1xˆl1−1 +
bxˆl1−1
x∗
=
xˆl1−1
1 + λ
(84)
Deducting (83) from (84) gives:
a2l2(xˆ
l2−1x∗l1−1 − x∗l2−1xˆl1−1) + b
x∗l1 − xˆl1
x∗xˆ
=
x∗l1−1 − xˆl1−1
1 + λ
(85)
Adding and subtracting xˆl2−1xˆl1−1 to the LHS of (85) and after performing some simple
manipulations we obtain:
a2l2(xˆ
l2−1zl1−1 − xˆl1−1zl2−1) =
zl1−1
1 + λ
− b
zl1
x∗xˆ
(86)
from which we readily obtain:
a2 = l
−1
2
[ zl1−1
1 + λ
− b
zl1
x∗xˆ
]
(xˆl2−1zl1−1 − xˆl1−1zl2−1)−1 (87)
Using analogous steps we obtain the following expression for a1:
a1 = l
−1
1
[ zl2−1
1 + λ
− b
zl2
x∗xˆ
]
(xˆl1−1zl2−1 − xˆl2−1zl1−2)−1 (88)
After substituting a1 and a2 into (iii) and multiplying by 1 + λ we find that:
l−11
[
zl2−1 − (1 + λ)b
zl2
x∗xˆ
]
(xˆl1−1zl2−1 − xˆl2−1zl1−2)−1)zl1
+ l−12
[
zl1−1 − (1 + λ)b
zl1
x∗xˆ
]
(xˆl2−1zl1−1 − xˆl1−1zl2−1)−1zl2 = z + κ− b(1 + λ) ln
( xˆ
x∗
)
(89)
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After which we find that:
κ = l−11
[
zl2−1 − (1 + λ)b
zl2
x∗xˆ
]
(xˆl1−1zl2−1 − xˆl2−1zl1−2)−1)zl1
+ l−12
[
zl1−1 − (1 + λ)b
zl1
x∗xˆ
]
(xˆl2−1zl1−1 − xˆl1−1zl2−1)−1zl2 − z + b(1 + λ) ln
( xˆ
x∗
)
(90)
which is the desired result.
For case II, we recall (i) - (iii) in case II:
a(l1xˆ
l1−1 + l2xˆ
l2−1) +
b
xˆ
=
1
1 + λ
(91)
a(l1x
∗l1−1 + l2x
∗l2−1) +
b
x∗
=
1
1 + λ
(92)
a(x∗l1 − xˆl1 + x∗l2 − xˆl2) =
x∗ − xˆ− κ
1 + λ
+ b ln
( xˆ
x∗
)
(93)
We firstly observe that subtracting (92) from (91) yields the following:
a(l1z
l1−1 + l2z
l2−1) =
bz
x∗xˆ
, (94)
After which we straightforwardly deduce that the constant a is given by the following ex-
pression:
a =
bz
x∗xˆ(l1zl1−1 + l2zl2−1)
. (95)
We now observe that after multiplying (91) and (92) by xˆ and x∗ respectively then subtract-
ing the result we find:
a(l1z
l1 + l2z
l2) =
z
1 + λ
(96)
After substituting the expression for a (95) into (96) and dividing through by z we find that:
b(l1z
l1 + l2z
l2)
xˆx∗(l1zl1−1 + l2zl2−1)
=
1
1 + λ
, (97)
from which we straightforwardly deduce that
λ =
xˆx∗
b
(l1z
l1−1 + l2z
l2−1)
(l1zl1 + l2zl2)
− 1 (98)
which is the stated result.
Lastly, to derive the expression for κ we appeal to (93), indeed multiplying (93) by (1+λ)
and rearranging immediately yields:
κ = a(1 + λ)(zl1 + zl2)− b ln
( xˆ
x∗
)
(1 + λ)− z (99)
Now, inverting (97) gives:
1 + λ =
xˆx∗(l1z
l1−1 + l2z
l2−1)
b(l1zl1 + l2zl2)
(100)
Lastly substituting (100) and (96) into (99) gives:
κ = z
zl1 + zl2
l1zl1 + l2zl2
− ln
( xˆ
x∗
)
xˆx∗
[
l1z
l1−1 + l2z
l2−1
l1zl1 + l2zl2
]
− z, (101)
from which we deduce the result.
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